Waterbottom Issues - II. Public Use by Tracy, Patrick G., Jr.
Annual Institute on Mineral Law
Volume 54 The 54th Annual Institute on Mineral Law Article 7
4-12-2007
Waterbottom Issues - II. Public Use
Patrick G. Tracy Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings
Part of the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Mineral Law Institute at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Annual Institute on Mineral Law by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Tracy, Patrick G. Jr. (2007) "Waterbottom Issues - II. Public Use," Annual Institute on Mineral Law: Vol. 54 , Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol54/iss1/7
3. Waterbottom Issues - II. Public Use
Patrick G. Tracy, Jr.
Attorney at Law, Lafayette, Louisiana
"ghings which are common are those whose property belongs to nobody, and which af men
may freey use, conformably to the use for which nature has intended them, such are air,
running water, the sea and its shores. 'rom the public use of sea shores, itfolTows that every
one has a rght to buiff there a cabin, to retire to, andifewise to fandthere, either to fish or
to shelter themseles from the storm, to moor ships, to dry nets, and the fikf, provided no
amage arise from the same to the buildings or monuments erected by the owners of the
adjoining property. <Pu6c things are those the property of which belongs to a whole nation,
andthe use of which is alowedto af the members of the nation: Of this ind are navigabe
rivers, sea ports, roads, harbours, high ways, and the bed of rivers as long as the same is
covered with water. The use of the shores of navgabe rivers or creely is public; accordingly
every one has a ght freety to bring his ships to fand there, to makffast the same to the trees
which are there planted to unfoathis vessels, to eposit his goods, to diy his nets, and the
irj. ZVeverthefess the property of the river shores 6etong[s] to those who possess the adoin-
ing ands. ... Wif beasts, birds and af! the animats which are bred in the sea, the air, or
upon the earth, do, as soon as they are taryn, become instantfy by the faw of nations, the
property of the captor for it is agreeabe to natural reason, that those things which have no
owner, shoufifbecome the property of the first occupant..Andit is not materialwhether they
are tarfn by a man upon his own groundor upon the grountof another. <But yet it is certain
that whoever has entered into the ground of another for the sae of hunting or fowling,
might have been prohibitedfrom entering by the proprietor of the ground!if he hadtforeseen
the intent."
cftiest of 1808
These principles, among the body of civil laws in force at the dawn
of Louisiana statehood,' have spawned substantial modem debate and
litigation over the issue of public access to and use of the waters and bot-
toms of both navigable and non-navigable water bodies in Louisiana.
This presentation will examine the debate, the recent legislative and judi-
cial developments which have addressed the issue of public access to
water bodies in Louisiana, and some implications of both for mineral
rights owners and operators.
I. A BriefBackground to the Controversy
The Civil Code. Our modem Civil Code declares air and the high
seas to be common things, owned by no one and subject to free use by
I See Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 of "A Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the
Territory of Orleans, With Alterations and Amendments Adapted to its Presept Form of
Government," enacted March 31, 1808 by the territorial legislature. For a detailed back-
ground to the development of the law of Louisiana in this area, see the Louisiana State
Law Institute Advisory Opinion relative to non-navigable waterbottoms in light of Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi at 53 La. L. Rev. 35, 40-68 (1992).
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everyone conformable with the use that nature intended.' Running wa-
ters, the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, 3 the terri-
torial sea, and the seashore are classified as public things that belong to
the state.' The Code provides that everyone has the right to fish in the
rivers, ports, road!;teads, and harbors, and the right to land on the sea-
shore, to fish, to shelter himself, to moor ships, to dry nets, and the like,
so long as he does not cause injury to the property of another. Public use
of both public and common things must accord with applicable laws and
regulations.5
The banks of navigable rivers or streams are private things that are
subject to public use, but, according to well-settled Louisiana jurispru-
dence, the servituc e of public use on the bank is limited to purposes that
are incidental to the navigable character of the stream and its enjoyment
as an avenue of commerce.' The beds of nonnavigable rivers, streams or
lakes are private things.! Under the Code, the owner of a tract of land
may forbid entry to anyone for purposes of hunting or fishing, and the
like, but, despite a prohibition of entry, captured wildlife belongs to the
captor.8
Policy Decla'ations. In 1954, the Louisiana Legislature declared
that it has been the public policy of the State of Louisiana at all times
since its admission into the Union that all navigable waters and the beds
of same within its boundaries are common or public things and insuscep-
tible of private ownership and that no act of the Louisiana Legislature
has been enacted in contravention of that policy.9 In 1978, the Legisla-
ture proclaimed as "public trust" policy that "the beds and bottoms of all
2 C.C. art. 449.
3 The 1978 Revisian Comments explain that "natural navigable water bodies" refers
to inland waters the xttoms of which belong to the state either by virtue of its inherent
sovereignty or by virtu: of other modes of acquisition including expropriation.
4 C.C. art. 450.
s C.C. art. 452. For example, in 1995 the State of Louisiana through the Department
of Wildlife and Fisheries imposed use limitations upon state-owned lands within the
Sherbourne Wildlife Management Area of the Atchafalaya Basin in Iberville Parish.
Emergency regulations adopted May 4, 1995 included provisions which closed certain
tracts of recently fores-:ed land to crawfishing, set a crawfish season on the remainder of
the property, required L crawfish permit and set a fee therefor and restricted use of motor
boats on some of the property. See LAC 76: V1l.177, reprinted at Volume 21 Louisiana
Register No. 5. These regulations were deemed necessary due to the negative impact on
wildlife and timber resources from unregulated commercial and recreational crawfishing
on the public property.
6 C.C. art. 456 and comment (b).
See C.C. art. 506 and the comments thereunder.
8 C.C. art. 3413.
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navigable waters and the banks or shores of bays, arms of the sea, the
Gulf of Mexico, and navigable lakes, belong to the State of Louisiana
and the policy of this state is declared to be that these lands and water-
bottoms, hereafter referred to as "public lands," shall be protected, ad-
ministered and conserved to best insure full public navigation, fishery,
recreation, and other interests. Unregulated encroachments upon these
properties may result in injury and interference with the public use and
enjoyment and may create hazards to the health, safety, and welfare of
the citizens of this state. To provide for the orderly protection and man-
agement of the stateowned properties and serve the best interests of all
citizens, the lands and waterbottoms, except those excluded and ex-
empted herein below, or as otherwise provided by law, shall be under the
management of the Department of Natural Resources ... which shall be
responsible for the control, permitting, and leasing of encroachments
upon public lands, in accordance with this Chapter and the laws of Lou-
isiana and the United States."' 0
The Phillips Decision. A decade later, the United States Supreme
Court, in a 5-3 decision, ruled in Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi," that
the public trust doctrine, derived from English common law, vested in
the State of Mississippi, by right of sovereignty, ownership of all lands
under waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tides, including the beds
of non-navigable waters located several miles inland from the Gulf Coast
but nonetheless subject to tidal influence because they were adjacent and
tributary to the navigable Jourdan River which flows directly into the
Gulf. The court found that the State of Mississippi had consistently rec-
ognized a public trust title to lands under tidewaters and a public trust
interest in the use of such lands beyond just navigation, and including
recreation, fishing and mineral development. The ruling effectively di-
vested private ownership of the affected waterbottoms under a record
title spanning more than a century, which had included payment of taxes
to the state of Mississippi on the disputed lands, prompting re-
examination in many states of the "public trust" limits of sovereignty
title claims, including in Louisiana. By Act 998 of 1992 (La. R.S.
9:1115.1, et seq.), the Legislature sought to distinguish the law of Lou-
isiana from the state law of Mississippi and "thereby quiet titles to lands
which have long been owned by private persons but which titles may
have been clouded as a result of the Phillips decision." Consistent with a
Louisiana State Law Institute Advisory Legal Opinion relative to non-
navigable waterbottoms,12 the Act declared inland non-navigable water
10 See La. R.S. 41:1701, et seq. (emphasis added). See also R.S. 56:640.3 (regarding
regulatory protection of the right to fish marine waters).
" 484 U.S. 469. 108 S. Ct. 791, 98 L. Ed. 2d 877 (1988).
12 See 53 La. L. Rev. 35 at 67, 68, concluding that Louisiana law and jurisprudence
had historically regarded navigability as the hallmark of the public trust limitations af-
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beds and bottoms which are not sea, arms of the sea, or seashore but
which are subject to being covered by water from the influence of the
tide, to be private things which may be owned by private persons or by
the state and its political subdivisions in their capacity as private persons.
The Act also declared that no provision therein shall be interpreted to
create, enlarge, restrict, terminate, or affect in any way any right or claim
to public access and use of such lands, including but not limited to navi-
gation, crawfishing, shellfishing, and other fishing, regardless of whether
such claim is based on existing law, custom and usage, or jurisprudence.
A Look at a Brewing Controversy. A 1995 Report by the Rights to
Public Access Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute consid-
ered assertions of public access rights under state and federal law to in-
undated private lands, including claims arising under the Commerce
Clause of the Unite.d States Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, Lou-
isiana's Act of Admission into the Union, the classification of common,
public, and private things under state law, and the legal servitudes im-
posed by state law on certain private things. While noting the possible
effects of pending litigation, the Committee opined that:
* apart from the possibility of rights of access recognized in
Vaughn v. Vermilion Corporation, 444 U.S. 206, 100 S. Ct. 399, 62
L. Ed. 2d 3651 (1979) if, in the construction of a private canal, the
navigability of previously navigable public waterways is destroyed,
individual rights of access exist only as a matter of state law;.
* as a matter of state law, the right to control access to property
will generally depend upon the classification of the property as ei-
ther public or private, but there is generally no right to access or use
lands classified as private, even when periodically overflowed by
running waters, unless the public has in some manner acquired
rights of access from the owner or such rights are conferred by law;
* the public enjoys the right of use in the beds of state-owned
navigable rivers and streams, between the limits of ordinary low wa-
ter, and in the beds of state-owned navigable lakes and bays, within
the limits of ordinary high water, subject to any lawful restrictions
and regulatior s adopted by the state;
* the public's right to use the banks of navigable rivers and
streams is limited to purposes incidental to their navigable character
and enjoymert as avenues of commerce which would include the
fecting Louisiana waterbottoms in much the same fashion as the dissenting justices in
Phillips viewed the common law public trust doctrine, that the bottoms of inland non-
navigable water bodies. (beyond the sea or seashore), even if influenced the tide, have
been recognized in Louisiana to be private things susceptible of private ownership, and
that the acquisition of i itle by right of sovereignty does not of itself preclude divestiture
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right to navigate over water-covered banks. The Committee could
reach no informed conclusion as to which particular uses are permit-
ted by C.C. art. 456, finding no available law or jurisprudence
squarely dealing with the right to fish or hunt from a boat navigating
in waters above the bank but noting broad language in Warner v.
Clarke, 232 So.2d 99 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1970), writ denied; Edmis-
ton v. Wood, 566 So.2d 673 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1990), and C.C. art.
3413 that could be read to foreclose such public rights;
* it is doubtful that personal servitudes can be acquired by the
general public by prescription, and Louisiana courts have been re-
luctant to find that servitudes of use have been created through tacit
dedication;
* there is no right of access to sovereignty lands under any notion
of a state public trust doctrine, the rights being instead found in the
traditional classification of some things as public and by the legal
servitudes of public use imposed for limited purposes on certain
private things;
* any legislation which deprives a landowner of the ability to con-
trol access to property over which he currently has that authority is
likely to result in a taking for which compensation is due.
It is perhaps not surprising that private ownership rights and public
use claims would eventually collide in a state dubbed the "Sportsman's
Paradise" or that a major battleground would be the Atchafalaya Basin,'3
where some members of the public at large-claiming "water rights"-
are converging on prime crawfishing and hunting terrain in swamp,
marsh, or shallow lake basins, often through private canals or sloughs (in
low water periods) or over flood waters (in high water periods), challeng-
ing private ownership rights vested by state and federal patents issued
over a century ago to these natural swamp and overflowed lands.14
1 The Atchafalaya Basin contains over two million acres, some 595,000 of which are
embraced within a floodway more than 130 miles long, along which guide levees now
artificially confine the area affected by the floodway's major water course, the Atchafa-
laya River. The Lower Atchafalaya Basin Floodway alone contains lands and waterbot-
toms situated within six Louisiana parishes, including vast areas of swamp and over-
flowed land under private ownership emanating from the Federal Swamp Land Grants of
1849 and 1850.
14 It has been estimated that over 8.9 million acres of land were approved to the State
of Louisiana as swamp and overflowed pursuant to the Federal Swamp Land Grant Acts.
The purpose of these grants was to aid the State of Louisiana, through the revenues to be
generated by the sale and subsequent taxation of such lands, in constructing the necessary
levees and drains to protect the valuable agricultural lands, plantations and settlements along
the Mississippi River and its major distributaries from annual floods and to reclaim the
swamp and overflowed lands within the State. See Act of March 2, 1849, C. 87, 9 Stat. 352
and Act of September 28, 1850, C. 84, 9 Stat. 519; see 43 U.S.C. §981 et seq.; see also La.
Acts 74 of 1892, 18 of 1894, 160 of 1900 and 205 of 1910; and Madden, Federal and State
Lands in Louisiana (1973) at pages 259 et seq., particularly page 276, footnote 92. In
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There has apparently existed since early in the last century a percep-
tion by many that land within the Basin was open to use by anyone for
hunting, trapping, fishing, and the like without the need for permission
from anyone. A tolerancF of public use by many owners of land which
was unsuitable for cultivation, habitation or similar uses because of its
character as swamp or its exposure to annual floods,'5 or too difficult or
expensive to regularly post and patrol, opened the door to modem prac-
tices now claimed to be a cultural tradition. Louisiana jurisprudence has
long recognized that mere tolerance of a public use of private property such
as hunting or fishiig over a long period of time does not create a right or
servitude in the public or prevent a landowner from thereafter attempting to
restrict or prohibit such public use.'6 Louisiana jurisprudence has also rec-
ognized that the public at large does not have the right to hunt, trap or
fish on the banks of navigable rivers without permission from the ripar-
ilan owner.17 Doctcinal authorities on Louisiana property law have simi-
larly recognized that the banks of navigable rivers and swamp lands sub-
McDade v. Bossier Levee Board, 109 La. 625, 33 So. 628 (La. 1902), the Louisiana Supreme
Court affirmed that even permanently overflowed lands, or so-called shallow lakes, were
included within the fed ral swamp land grants.
1s The principal ccmmercial value of such land was frequently viewed in terms of its
timber resources and/or potential for mineral development. Moreover, given the nature of
such lands, the regular physical presence required for practical abatement of such uses
could seldom be justif ied.
.6 See, for example, McCearley v. Lemennier, 40 La. Ann. 253, 3 So. 649 (La. 1888);
Amigo Enterprises, Inc. v. Gonzales, 581 So. 2d 1082 (La. App. 4t Cir. 1991); Cenac v.
Public Access Water Rights Association, et al, 851 So. 2d 1006 (La. 2003); Schoeffler, et
al v. Drake Hunting Cjub, et al, 919 So. 2d 822 (La. App. 3 d Cir. 2006) [The Court com-
nented: "We cannot avoid the observation that where one owner of long ago may have
invited the public to :ish and hunt his land, a modem owner may be less generous, or
more concerned with .iability associated with free access, or obligated to his lessors who
pay for the privilege of access. The argument that a thing has 'always' been done, does
not provide a cause oi right of action."]; compare La. R.S. 9:1251. Opinions of the Attor-
ney General of the State of Louisiana have also recognized the right of private landown-
ers to prohibit commercial fishermen from crawfishing on privately owned swamp land
that is inundated by adjacent water bodies, or to prohibit hunting, trapping or fishing on
the banks of navigable streams. See, e.g., Louisiana Attorney General Opinion Nos.40-
96, 77-1540, 88-649, 91-195.
, See, e.g., State v. Richardson,. 72 So. 984 (La. 1916); Delta Securities Co. v. Du-
fresne, 160 So. 620, 181 La. 891 (La. 1935); Warner v. Clarke, 232 So.2d 99 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1970), writ denied; Edmiston v. Wood, 566 So.2d 673 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1990);
Buckskin Hunting Club v. Bayard, 868 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 2004); Walker
Lands, Inc.. v. East Corroll Parish Police Jury, 871 So. 2d 1258 (La. App. 2 nd Cir, 2004),
writ denied 903 So. 2d 442 (La. 2005). Louisiana courts have also indicated that riparian
servitudes, being in derogation of private property rights, must be strictly construed in
accordance with the law and not given a broad, liberal interpretation. Warner v. Clarke
supra; Meyers v. Dentgn, 747 So. 2d 633 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1999), writ denied.
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ject to overflow are private things on which the public does not enjoy the
right to hunt or fish.
In Warner v. Clarke," the Second Circuit Court of Appeal refused
to enjoin the prosecution of plaintiffs for criminal trespass arising from
their desire to hunt and fish on privately owned lands adjacent to the
Mississippi River situated between the levee and the river. In rejecting
the plaintiffs' right to an injunction, the Court recognized that plaintiffs
enjoy no property right to hunt and fish on such lands under the public
servitude granted by law to use such lands for purposes incident to navi-
gation upon the Mississippi River. In Edmiston v. Wood,20 the Second
Circuit considered a claim of public right to hunt and fish upon privately
owned land bordering on the Mississippi River and adjoining Yucatan
Lake in Northeast Louisiana which had been posted against trespassing
by the owner. The posted lands were generally covered by bottomland
hardwood timber and had been used by the private owner for many years
for commercial timber operations, pasturage and the leasing of hunting
rights thereon. Portions of the land were subject to occasional flood from
backwaters of the Mississippi River only during certain high water peri-
ods. When the river reached levels in excess -of 16' at Vicksburg, the wa-
ters of the river would cover portions of the land permitting entry over
and across the land by boat from the river or the adjacent navigable lake
due to the fact that a portion of the land was submerged under flood wa-
ters of the river and/or lake. Plaintiffs argued that when the river is high
enough to flood the land to a depth sufficient to allow navigation
thereon, the land became part of one or both of these navigable bodies of
water and was subject to public use. The appellate court noted that the
lands in question did not comprise a portion of the banks of either of the
navigable bodies of water, holding that land does not become subject to
public use when a navigable body of water overflows its normal bed and
temporarily covers the adjacent privately owned land.
State v. Barras," considered the validity of trespass charges brought
against two crawfishermen for actively conducting commercial crawfish
harvesting on lands south of the Lake Long area of the Atchafalaya Basin
without permission of the owners and after being orally forbidden to re-
main on such lands. The lands involved were flooded swamp lands, in-
undated by waters of the Atchafalaya River and its distributaries for up to
six months of each year with depths of water in the crawfishing areas
Is See A.N. Yiannopoulos, La. Civil Law Treatise, Vol. 2, Property, §§56-61,85 (3rd
Ed., 1991). Note also La. R. S. 56:648.1, prohibiting such activities by any person on pri-
vate property in disturbance or harassment of hunters, trappers or fishermen who have
been given permission by the owner to take wild animals.
19 232 So.2d 99 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970), writ denied.
20 566 So.2d 673 (La. App. 2"d Cir. 1990).
21 615 So.2d 285 (La. 1993).
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ranging from 6 inches to 6 feet. The crawfishermen claimed that the
lands were subject to public use as part of the banks of navigable streams
or by being covered by public navigable waters. The Louisiana Supreme
Court affirmed the trespass convictions, recognizing that the area in
question was backwater swamp land within the Atchafalaya River's
floodplain which (lid not, by its mere susceptibility to crawfish activity
and navigation dujing flood conditions, become public navigable waters
or render the private property subject to public use.
In 1995, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana, in a case entitled Charles R. Blanchard, Sr. and West Louisi-
ana Crawfish Producers Association, Inc. vs. Williams, Inc. andAtchafa-
laya Crawfish Corservation Association, Civil Action No. 92-0941 L-O,
involving 95,000 acres of land within the Atchafalaya Basin, determined,
among other thing s, that no individual federal rights to fish and navigate
in the massive are i of privately-owned swamp land placed in dispute in
that proceeding arse under the public trust doctrine or under the Act of
Admission of Louisiana into the Union in 1812,22 and that there is no
federal constitutional right to crawfish on privately-owned subaqueous
land, even if navigable-in-fact to commercial crawfishermen. The court
observed that, because activities such as crawfishing do not in any way
constitute navigation or traversal, and, in fact, tend to create obstacles to
pure navigation and traversal, such activities clearly fall outside the
scope of any navigational servitude which may or may not be imposed
upon the area in question under federal law. That decision was affirmed
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 23 and a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme
Court.
Article 3413 of the Louisiana Civil Code expressly recognizes that a
landowner enjoys the exclusive right to hunt and fish and conduct like
activities on his property and may forbid entry to anyone for such pur-
poses. As recogni2ed in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,24 the "right to ex-
clude" is universally held to be a fundamental element of the right of pri-
vate property, falli-ng clearly within the category of interests that the gov-
ernment cannot take without compensation. 25 Thus, any attempt to rec-
22 The Act stipulatod that the Mississippi River and the navigable rivers and waters
leading into same and into the Gulf of Mexico shall be common highways and forever
free to the inhabitants of Louisiana and of the other states and territories of the United
States without tax, duty, impost or toll imposed by the state. Act of February 20, 1811;
see 2 Stat. 642; 33 U.S.C.§10; see also Boykin & Lang v. Shaffer, 13 La. Ann. 129, 130-
131 (1858), Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Company, Inc., 985 F. 2d 824 (5 1 Cir. 1993).
23 98 F. 3d 1339 (5 Cir. 1996).
24 444 U.S. 164, 10) S. Ct. 383, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979).
25 See also Mongrue v. Monsanto Company, 1999 WL 219774, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis
5543 (E.D. La. April 9, 1999), affirmed at 249 F.3d 422 (51, Cir. 2001); Dardar v. La-
fourche Realty Co., Inc, 985 F. 2d 824 (5" Cir. 1993) (Inland non-navigable water bodies
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ognize a general public right of access and use for fishing, hunting, trap-
ping and similar uses under the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution could run afoul of the Fifth Amendment and amount to a
taking of private property without compensation.
II. A Closer Look at the Recent Developments
Cenac v. Public Access Water Rights Association, et al,
851 So. 2d 1006 (La. 2003)
Action by a landowner to (i) obtain declaratory judgment establish-
ing his ownership and possession of property in Lafourche Parish includ-
ing a parking area, boat launch, and a portion of a private canal known as
the Company Canal connecting Bayou Lafourche and Bayou Des Alle-
mands and providing access to Lake Salvador and (ii) enjoin the defen-
dants from engaging in acts that interfere with his use and enjoyment of
the property. The defendants included a local community association and
several individuals who claimed possession of real rights-by unopposed
use for several years-in the form of a servitude of right of way and use
to cross the property, use the parking area, and launch boats into the ca-
nal, which was disturbed by the plaintiffs attempt to erect a security
fence around the boat launch and parking area. The defendants also
claimed that the public had acquired a servitude of use of these areas by
implied dedication, and, alternatively, that the Company Canal was a
public canal, was formally dedicated to public use, or was a private canal
subject to public use.
The trial court declared Cenac the owner of the property in dispute
and issued a permanent injunction barring the defendants from launch-
ing, parking or otherwise using the boat launch but declaring that Ce-
nac's ownership of the canal was burdened by a servitude of use in favor
of the public by virtue of implied dedication. The First Circuit Court of
Appeal affirmed the grant to Cenac of the permanent injunction but re-
versed the judgment declaring the canal to be dedicated to public use by
implied dedication, as the defendants had failed to establish the plain and
positive intent of the landowners to dedicate the canal and boat launch to
public use. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine
the issue of implied dedication.
The Court noted that the defendants had conceded that they had not
acquired a servitude over the property by acquisitive prescription and
that the only method of dedication applicable to the case was implied
and swamp land subject even to indirect tidal overflow may be privately-owned under
Louisiana law). Note also in this regard the Submerged Lands Act, which expressly rec-
ognizes that the use of submerged lands beneath navigable waters of the United States for
fisheries was vested either in the State of Louisiana or the private individuals in owner-
ship of the lands or the right to fish thereon as of the effective date of that legislation. See
43 U.S.C §1311(a). Thus, La. R.S. 41:1701 recognizes public fishery interests of the
State in, and its management authority over, state-owned navigable waterbottoms.
-56-
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dedication.26 The Court observed that implied dedication was a common
law doctrine recognized by Louisiana courts since the nineteenth century,
which, because it lacked the formalities and safeguards of the other
modes of dedication, requires "an unequivocally manifested intent to
dedicate on the rart of the owner and an equally clear intent to accept on
the part of the public." The Court specifically held that while mainte-
nance [of the way or road] by a municipality can be a factor in determin-
ing whether an implied dedication has been made, it is not required, and
repudiated any language of prior cases suggesting otherwise. The Court
observed that im'lied dedication results only in a servitude of public use
and does not transfer ownership, and that the burden of proving such
dedication falls on the party asserting the dedication.27
According to the Court, for an implied dedication to occur, the
"plain and positive intent to dedicate" must be shown by language or acts
so unequivocal and decisive of an intent to abandon the property to the
specific public use as to exclude every other hypothesis but that of dedi-
cation. An owner's toleration of and acquiescence in long and continuous
public use of his land, without more, is insufficient to establish a plain
and positive intent to dedicate. Moreover, although the private canal was
navigable, this fac~t alone does not render it public. 28
The evidence at trial indicated that the public had been using both
the boat launch and the canal for at least 60 years. Prior owners of the
canal never interfered when the public used the boat launch and the canal
for access to Lake Salvador. Evidence also indicated some minor acts of
maintenance oftl-e boat launch by the public (e.g., filling pot holes, pick-
ing up trash, installing cleats to tie up boats) and some spraying of the
canal to keep it free of vegetation that would prohibit navigation. The
26 The Court note J that the Louisiana legislature has never enacted a comprehensive
scheme governing dcdication to public use, but that the courts have recognized four
modes of dedication t> public use: formal, statutory, implied and tacit.
Among its matrial findings, the Court agreed with the trial court that La. R.S.
9:1251 applies only to the boat launch and does not prevent the acquisition of a public
servitude over the wa:ers of the canal. R.S. 9:1251 recognizes that a landowner may vol-
untarily permit passage across his land by the public for the purpose of providing a con-
venience in access to and from waters for boating, and even allow maintenance of such
passage by a governing authority, without thereby establishing a servitude of passage in
favor of the public or a public road or street. The statute does not exclude, however, the
possibility for a landowner to specifically dedicate such passages to public use.
18 Uncontroverted evidence at trial indicated that when the canal was built, it did not
divert any natural stream or water body. Note also that the ruling disregards comments
made in an earlier dec ision of the Court involving possession of the partially submerged
bed and bottom of the non-navigable Amite River, which inferred that fishing, swim-
fming, and digging for clams were natural activities done in the use of running waters of
the state by members Df the public at large. See Chaney v. State Mineral Board, 444 So.
2d 105 at 111 (La. 1983). Note Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co,, Inc., 985 F. 2d 824 at
334 (5h' Cir. 1993).
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Supreme Court noted, however, that evidence also revealed that the prior
owners took pains to insure that the property remained private and not
subject to any rights in favor of the public by posting signs at the launch
and canal asserting the private nature of the property (for at least 30
years), gave explicit permission to use the property to those who re-
quested it, prohibited hunting in the canal and other unapproved uses by
the public, retained responsibility for maintenance of the property (in-
structing employees that no public funds were to be spent on the prop-
erty), and made no attempt to acknowledge any right of the public to the
boat launch or canal in the sale of the property to Cenac.
On consideration of the evidence, the Court ruled that the trial court
legally erred in concluding that because the canal was built for the pur-
pose of navigation and had been used by the public for navigation for
many years, an implied dedication occurred. The central issue was
whether the previous owners unequivocally manifested a plain and posi-
tive intent to dedicate the boat launch and canal to public use. Finding
permissive use and minor maintenance of the launch and canal by the
public, in itself, insufficient to establish such intent,29 the Court found
that the defendants failed to present evidence sufficient to show a plain
and positive intent to dedicate to the exclusion of every other hypothesis
but that of dedication, and that, as the court of appeals decided, neither
the boat launch nor the canal was burdened with a servitude of public use
by implied dedication.
Buckskin Hunting Club v. Bayard, 868 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 3rd
Cir. 2004).
Action by a hunting lessee of approximately 14,000 acres of land in
the Atchafalaya Basin for an injunction prohibiting six individuals claim-
ing public use rights from entering the leased property. The defendants
asserted various theories of public access to the lands and private canals
within the leased premises arising from "navigability" of the affected
property, even contending that at certain stages of the water they were
arguably entitled to use all the land between the eastern and western
guide levees of the Basin.30 After considering extensive testimony and
other evidence, the trial court granted the permanent injunction prohibit-
ing the defendants from hunting in the private man-made canals, or on or
along the banks of navigable rivers, bayous or streams, or in or upon any
29 Evidence regarding the enlarging of the parking area by the owners out of liability
concerns about cars parking too near the highway was not deemed inconsistent with pre-
serving rights of unencumbered private ownership in the property.
3o The trial court observed in this regard that the Atchafalaya Basin is not itself a
natural waterway, but rather is a creation of the United States Army Corps of Engineers
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of the private land3' situated within the boundaries of the leased property,
even if such lands are periodically inundated by water. The injunction
prohibited not only the shooting of deer or other wildlife on such private
lands from boats in the waters of such rivers, bayous, streams and canals,
but also precluded allowing dogs owned, used or under the custody and
control of defendants from entering the leased property to hunt or chase
deer or other wildlife or for any other purpose. In addressing the various
public use issue; raised by the defendants on appeal, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeal quoted approvingly from the findings and legal analysis
of the trial court, summarized herein as follows:
Regarding use ofprivate lands periodically inundated with water:
In this case, it was acknowledged that the water levels in the Basin
may cover land areas, from time to time, anywhere from six inches
to twelve feet. This does not convert all of the land that becomes
covered with water to "banks" which are subject to public use. [cit-
ing State v. Barras, 615 So. 2d 285 (La. 1993)] There is no issue in
the Court's mind but that this privately leased land is not subject to
use by the public merely because during some periods of the year it
is flooded swampland. This Court recognizes the difference between
the banks of a navigable river and the flood plains of a navigable
river, in this case, the Atchafalaya River. As to those banks which
are along nE.vigable rivers within the leased premises, the uses of
these banks are limited to navigation and not hunting.
Regarding use of private canals and waterways:
Defendants argue that if a man-made canal system destroyed the
navigability .f surrounding natural waterways, this may constitute a
defense to trespass by use of the private canal because the private
canal becomes subject to public use. There was testimony from
some of the defendants ... that previous navigable waterways were
silted up ... due to the construction of man-made canals in the vicin-
ity; however, they also acknowledge that the Corps of Engineers
began controlling the water level in the Basin. Further, defendants
did not present any expert testimony or specific factual bases to
support this claim. While it is important that the Basin remain tra-
versable so that individuals may get to their private land and the
public may access State land, this does not allow the public to use
privately owned canals at will and to hunt from within these pri-
vately owned canals.
Defendants argue that there was an expenditure of public funds for
cleaning up the banks of some of the man-made canals after Hurri-
cane Andrew. However, defendants did not present any evidence of
the express or tacit agreement of the private landowners. ... Without
31 Lands claimed by the State were not at issue in the proceeding.
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establishing consent of the private landowners, the state cannot uni-
laterally spend money on private waterways thereby converting
them to public use without the agreement of the landowner and/or
some exercise of [eminent] domain which would necessarily in-
volve just compensation."
Additionally, the fact that the canal is navigable in fact does not
thereby render it public."
Regarding public access to "running waters":
The obligations arising from water being a public thing requires the
owner through whose estate running waters pass to allow water to
leave his estate through its natural channel and not to unduly dimin-
ish its flow; however, this does not mandate that [the] landowner al-
low public access to the waterway.34 Landowners and members of
[the] general public have [the] right to use running water for their
needs, if they have access to it, but neither landowners nor the
members of [the] general public have the right to cross private lands
in order to avail themselves of running water, and such right may
only be established by agreement, destination of [the] owner, or pre-
scription. No public rights to use of a canal on private property arise
from the fact that water flows through the channel.
Regarding Corps of Engineers jurisdiction over "navigable waters of the
United States: "
Defendants also contend that by virtue of the regulations of the
Corps of Engineers, these man-made canals fall within the defini-
tion of navigable waters subject to public use. ... The regulations
cited by Defendants merely allow the Corps to seek to exercise
regulatory control should it determine that, in fact, the waterway is
within its jurisdiction and regulatory powers. ... this would be
something that would be sought by the Corps, on a canal by canal
basis. There is no such issue involved in this case... .The Defen-
dants have no basis to assert the right of the Corps of Engineers to
control or regulate the private waterways herein, especially in view
of the fact that the Corps has not seen fit to do so. s In Vaughn v.
Vermilion Corporation, 444 U.S. 206, 100 S. Ct. 399, 62 L. Ed. 2d
32 Citing Amigo Enterprises, Inc. v. Gonzales, 581 So. 2d 1082 (La, App. 4 th Cir.
1991).
3 Citing National Audubon Society v. White, 302 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 3,' Cir. 1974),
writ denied.
34 Citing, inter alia, People for Open Wcters, Inc. v. Estate of Gray, 643 So. 2d 415
(La. App. 3rd Cir. 1994).
3s The trial court concluded that the exercise of this regulatory power would still 1.0t
allow the Defendants to hunt in the private canals or along the banks of the navigable
rivers or private swampland thereof.
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365 (1979), the court held that no general right of use in the public
to a private canal arises by reason of the authority over navigation
conferred x pon Congress by the Commerce Clause of the constitu-
tion.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal also observed that the testimony
in the case was imdisputed that, at various times of the year, the property
in question may be traversable by the defendants and others in various
size boats. This Fact, however, does not make those waterways navigable
as that term is used in the jurisprudence and in La. Civ. Code art. 450
[definition of public things], noting that the Louisiana Supreme Court's
Barras and Cenac decisions demonstrate that the presence of water dur-
ing a portion of the year does not alone qualify an area as a navigable
waterway, and tie mere fact that a canal is navigable does not render it
public. 6
Citing comnent (b) to La. Civ. Code art. 456, Edmiston v. Wood,
566 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 2nd Cir. 1990), and 2 Yiannopoulos Civil Law
Treatise, Properly §85 (4 1h Ed. 2001), the Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court's determination that the lawful public uses of the banks of
navigable streams are limited to those incident to navigation and do not
include hunting, a prohibition equally applicable to the overflowed lands
adjacent to such navigable waterways.
Act 813 of 2004 added La. R.S. 9:1254 which provides that the
owner of an enclosed estate who has no access to his estate other than by
way of an existing waterway through neighboring property (due to the
lack of sufficient land on which to feasibly construct a road) shall have a
right and servitude of passage on such waterway. The existing waterway
must be directly accessible from a publicly navigable waterway (and the
least injurious, shortest route of safe passage by water), and must have
been and still be capable of use for navigation by the owner of either the
dominant or the,. ervient estate at the time of the acquisition by the owner
of the dominant estate.
Act 927 of 2004 proposed an amendment to the Louisiana Constitu-
tion to guarantee the right of every citizen to hunt, fish, and trap, subject
to regulation, restriction, or prohibition as provided by law. As ratified
by Louisiana voters and adopted into law, effective December 7, 2004,
Article I, Section 27 of the Louisiana Constitution now provides:
The freedom to hunt, fish, and trap wildlife, including all aquatic
life, traditionally taken by hunters, trappers and anglers, is a valued
natural heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people. Hunt-
36 The Court alsc commented that the trial court was not required, in its credibil-
ity/weighing assessments, to credit defendants' testimony regarding their opinion as to
the diversion of natural waterways through the construction of privately-owned canals.
n Citing Barras and Edmiston, supra.
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ing, fishing and trapping shall be managed by law and regulation
consistent with Article IX, Section I of the Constitution of Louisi-
ana" to protect, conserve and replenish the natural resources of the
state. The provisions of this section shall not alter the burden of
proof requirements otherwise established by law for any challenge
to a law or regulation pertaining to hunting, fishing or trapping the
wildlife of the state, including all aquatic life. Nothing contained
herein shall be construed to authorize the use of private property to
hunt, fish, or trap without the consent of the owner of the property.
Walker Lands, Inc. v. East Carroll Parish Police Jury, 871 So. 2d
1258 (La. App. 2nd Cir, 2004), writ denied 903 So. 2d 442 (La.
2005).
Action by a landowner to obtain a declaratory judgment that Gas-
soway Lake and a drainage ditch which runs into the lake and provides
water to the lake in periods of high water on the Mississippi River are not
subject to public use and to obtain an injunction against the parish police
jury to stop all public use of Gassoway Lake and the drainage ditch. The
police jury joined the State of Louisiana to defend title and access to the
alleged public lands and was later dropped from the suit. The State
claimed ownership and/or a servitude to the bed, bottoms, and waters of
Gassoway Lake and the drainage ditch.
Evidence at trial established that the land where Gassoway Lake
now sits was either woods or farmland in 1812, but became part of the
bed of the Mississippi River when the river shifted westward by 1880.
The river then shifted back eastward, leaving behind dry land and stand-
ing water in a shallow swale in the land, the area today called Gassoway
Lake. Opposing theories by expert witnesses were presented regarding
the effects of the eastward shift on the modem landforms. According to
plaintiff's expert, the land now occupied by Gassoway Lake was created
through alluvion or accretion as the river shifted slowly and impercepti-
bly eastward to its current channel approximately 3V2 miles from the
lake. The lake is very shallow and has remained so since its formation,
being landlocked most of the year and receiving water only when the
Mississippi River floods causing water to enter the ditch and spill over
into the lake. A levee west of the lake contains the periodic floodwaters
on the Mississippi River which submerge Gassoway Lake and the sur-
rounding land, but these lands remain well above the ordinary low water
mark of the river. The State's expert witness suggested that Gassoway
Lake was created as a result of chute cut-off - the opening of a new
channel by the Mississippi River surrounding riparian land so as to make
3 Section 1 provides that the natural resources of the state and the healthful, scenic,
historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved and replen-
ished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people.
The legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.
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it an island, and that the lake was part of the main River channel in 1881
and remained part of the channel within the alluvion build-up after the
river moved eastward, eventually cutting the lake off from the river.
The trial court accepted as more credible the plaintiffs theory re-
garding the cre ition of Gassoway Lake, concluding that Gassoway Lake,
the drainage ditch, and the land between Gassoway Lake and the river
were owned by Walker Lands and that the lake and the ditch were not
navigable in fact or in law, and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting
the State or the general public from going on or about Gassoway Lake,
the drainage dilch, or the land between the lake and river. On appeal, the
State argued that Gassoway Lake was created from the former bed of the
Mississippi River, remained navigable and connected to the river as a
channel, and is public water under the law. It also argued that it is bur-
dened by a navigation servitude, a levee servitude and the public use
when below the ordinary high water of the Mississippi River. The Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeal found no clear error in the trial court's find-
ings that the Lake was created as a swale in the alluvial deposition which
occurred with the eastward movement of the river channel and that, as
private property outside the bed of the river, it is not rendered public land
when the river overflows its normal bed and temporarily covers the land
in periods of flood. The Second Circuit also affirmed the trial court's
non-navigability determination, noting that the evidence showed that the
lake was landlccked and the ditch was completely dry for most of the
year, making both unusable and unable to serve a useful commercial
purpose - a burden not met by demonstrating recreational use alone.
The Court pretermitted discussion of the State's claim to public use
of the Lake and ditch under legal public use servitudes affecting the river
bank and the levee, finding that there was no justiciable controversy pre-
sented showing that the State, through its agents, sought to use any rights
to such servitudes. The Court noted, however, that Louisiana jurispru-
dence has long held that the public use servitude on the banks of a navi-
gable river means that the public may use the bank only for a naviga-
tional purpose, which does not include fishing and hunting on flooded
lands within the high water mark of the river, citing the Barras and War-
ner v. Clarke decisions. The Court reversed the permanent injunction
issued by the trial court, finding that plaintiff can be given no relief from
a hypothetical public-at-large (as opposed to specific individuals), and
that there was no evidence of any violation by State officials or depart-
ments in attempting to invade plaintiffs property, no justiciable contro-
versy to warrani an injunction against the State, but that plaintiff could
use traditional remedies under the trespass statutes, or in damages or in-
junctive relief, against specific persons or entities which attempt to ex-
ploit its private property.
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Schoeffler, et al v. Drake Hunting Club, et al, 919 So. 2d 822 (La.
App. 3rd Cir. 2006).
Action by five individuals claiming public use rights to fish, craw-
fish, hunt, and navigate the waters of the Atchafalaya Basin for commer-
cial and recreational purposes. The original complaint requested a de-
claratory judgment and asserted a boundary action against private land-
owners and hunting and crawfishing lessees alleging that posted signs
and patrolling, among other actions, have impeded plaintiffs' alleged
right of public access to waters, tidal-influenced waterbottoms and the
private banks of streams subject to public use. The declaratory judgment
action requested (i) a declaration that the waters and areas at issue were
all running waters or bottoms of navigable waterbodies subject to the
influence of the tides and therefore public things subject to public use,
and (ii) a declaration that plaintiffs were entitled to fishing access and
other public use below the ordinary high water mark of Lake Cheti-
maches, a large ancient water feature within the Basin which plaintiffs
alleged now includes six named lakes and associated tributary and dis-
tributary waters, and (iii) an order requiring the defendants to remove
"no trespass" signs and other impediments to public access. The bound-
ary action requested the court to fix a high water boundary within the
challenged areas (affecting more than 85,000 acres of privately-owned
land) which would delineate the areas subject to public use. An amended
complaint by plaintiffs added the State of Louisiana as a defendant and
requested the aforementioned declaratory relief and asserted a mandamus
action to compel the State to "represent the public interest" and bring an
action to fix the public use boundaries against these defendants.
Exceptions raised by the private defendants to the complaint chal-
lenged, inter alia, (i) the breadth of the public use claims as to vast areas
of land and waterbottoms of different kinds under different ownership
and subject to different legal standards as to ownership and use, (ii) the
multiplicity and complexity of issues affecting determination of the pub-
lic use claims raised by the complaint, (iii) the varied nature of public use
high water boundaries and (iv) the lack of standing in plaintiffs as public
users to assert a boundary action. The State excepted to the complaint,
asserting, among other things, (i) that the Atchafalaya Basin is not one
large body of water open to public use, but was occupied by identifiable
uplands, swamps, rivers, lakes, bayous, and streams at the time of state-
hood, including Lake Chetimaches, making public claims to the bed of
that "lake" overreaching, and noting that thousands of acres of land were
sold by the government and are privately-owned, including swamp and
overflowed lands lawfully transferred to the State under the Swamp Land
Grant Acts of 1849 and 1850 and then into private ownership to generate
funds for levees and drainage to protect the interior lands more suited to
development; (ii) that plaintiffs actually seek access for all purposes to
these inundated private lands that they have no possessory or proprietary
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rights to access, (iii) that they have not stated a justiciable controversy,
and (iv) that the State has no duty to sue its own citizens on plaintiffs'
behalf over prcperty boundaries which it does not dispute.
Notable fbr our purposes in the trial court's disposition of the nu-
merous exceptions filed by the private defendants, as well as by the
State, the trial court dismissed the State from the action as to all demands
against it and dismissed the boundary action against the private defen-
dants. The trial court also granted exceptions of improper cumulation of
actions and res judicata39 by the private defendants, preserving plaintiffs'
citizen action under C. C. art. 458 for removal of obstructions to public
use as to areas and activities-in properly separated actions-which may
be determined to be lawfully open to such uses at trial. The appeal ad-
dressed only the dismissal of actions asserted against the State and the
dismissal of the boundary action against the private defendants.
The Third. Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, finding
that the plaintiffs, as public users, have neither cause of action under
C.C. arts. 784 ?t seq. and C.C. art. 456, nor right of action under C.C.P.
arts 3691 et seq. to fix a boundary between water flowing onto private
land and the navigable waters of the State of Louisiana which does not
establish a boundary between contiguous lands, is affected by fluid
stages of high and low water that change daily, is not susceptible to being
marked as a traditional boundary is marked, and as to which there is no
dispute between the private owners and lessees of the inundated private
lands, including stream banks, on the one hand, and the State of Louisi-
ana as owner of the navigable stream and lake beds on the other, as to the
line of separation between their contiguous ownership interests. The
Court also found that neither the allegations of the petition nor any evi-
dence presented on trial of the exceptions demonstrate that plaintiffs are
owners, lessees, usufructuaries or adverse possessors of the lands at issue
to vest in themi a real and actual legal interest sufficient to support the
boundary action asserted by them, rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that
"public use" of state-owned waters and waterbottoms is a legally recog-
nizable "usufruct" under Louisiana law.
As to the mandamus action against the State to compel the fixing of
such boundaries, the Court of Appeal found that there is no ministerial
duty of the State to fix the ambulatory high water boundaries throughout
the Atchafalaya Basin which are not required by law, where neither the
State nor the owners dispute the ownership boundary between their re-
spective property interests, where plaintiffs' rights to use state lands and
navigate over state waterbottoms are not being restricted by State defen-
dants, and where plaintiffs seek a legal remedy not provided by law to




Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 54 [2007], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol54/iss1/7
define precise limits of high water over numerous inundated private
lands not under control of the State. As to the declaratory judgment ac-
tion against the State, the Court of Appeal found that the plaintiffs' ac-
tion against the State is speculative and theoretical and that, while gen-
eral statutes exist recognizing rights of access to public waters, plaintiffs
have stated no "justiciable controversy," no actual dispute involving the
State, but have requested a declaratory judgment on numerous complex
issues which are not ripe for adjudication. In this regard, the Court noted
that the plaintiffs have "repeatedly asserted overbroad rights of access to
the waters of the Atchafalaya Basin" which must be narrowed in the nu-
merous trials which must ensue "to determine which bodies of water are
navigable lakes or navigable streams with bank servitudes, which are
mud flats or sloughs, which are non-navigable streams, bayous, bays,
lakes, lagoons, basins, depressions, flooded swamp, marshland, riparian
land, land subject to inland rights, fee ownership, and the issues go on
and on."
The Court further stated: "Since plaintiffs cannot seriously ask the
court to declare that all waters at issue are state-owned 'running waters'
subject to public use at this juncture, the request for declaratory judgment
against the State is tantamount to a mandamus action seeking to compel
the state to dec!are rights not adjudicated." The plaintiffs accordingly had
no standing to compel the State to make such broad declarations on their
behalf. Citing the broad discretion of the courts to determine whether
declaratory relief is appropriate to the character of the issues involved
and the nature of the relief sought in order to achieve the simple, expedi-
ent trial of cases without the usual formalities, the Court also recognized
that this case did not fit the standards or purposes of this procedural de-
vice.
Parm, v. Shumate, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61227 (W. D. La. Aug.
29, 2006).
Action by five individuals against the sheriff of East Carroll Parish
for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages under 42
U.S.C. §1983 and Louisiana state law, alleging that they were arrested
without probable cause for fishing and hunting on the waters of the Mis-
sissippi River, which covered property of Walker Cottonwood Farms,
LLC,4 0 including Gassoway Lake, during periodic flooding. The pro-
ceeding was initially stayed pending the outcome of the state court litiga-
tion entited Walker Lands, Inc.. v. East Carroll Parish Police Jury, su-
pra, which sought to enjoin public use of the same water bodies on
which the arrests occurred and which determined that Gassoway Lake
and the surrounding land, including a drainage ditch and connecting wa-
ter courses to the Mississippi River (some 3V2 miles away) were private
40 The successor in title to Walker Lands, Inc.
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property which was not navigable in fact, although accessible when the
Mississippi River floods and subject to public use "for a navigational
purpose" as part of the bank of the Mississippi River.
On cross-motions for summary judgment, Magistrate Judge James
D. Kirk made recommended findings, inter alia, that (i) plaintiffs have
both a federal common law right and a state law right to fish and hunt
from boats up to the ordinary high water mark of the Mississippi River,
regardless of the underlying ownership of the property,4' (ii) the sheriff
did not have probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs for trespass, (iii) the
sheriff did not enjoy qualified immunity for his actions, and (iv) plain-
tiffs were not entitled to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing Louisiana tres-
pass laws. Both parties filed timely objections to the Magistrate's report
and recommendations. On review, District Judge Robert G. James
adopted the recommended rulings that the sheriff was not entitled to
qualified immunity and that plaintiffs were not entitled to enjoin him
from enforcing Louisiana trespass laws; however, Judge James rejected
the recommendition that plaintiffs have a federal common law right to
fish and hunt on private lands flooded by the Mississippi River up to the
high water mark, refusing to broadly interpret Silver Springs Paradise
Co. v. Ray4 2-which had recognized a public right to reasonably use
navigable waters "for all legitimate purposes of travel and transporta-
tion," whether boating for pleasure or carrying persons or property for
hire-to include the right to hunt and fish on navigable waters which
periodically flood privately owned lands. Judge James agreed with Mag-
istrate Judge Kirk's finding that the private property in question was sub-
ject to public ue as part of the bank of the Mississippi River, but con-
cluded that hunting and fishing are not activities incidental to the naviga-
ble character of the river and its enjoyment as an avenue of commerce,
citing state court decisions rejecting such uses as within the ambit of
bank servitude under C.C. art. 456, including Warner v. Clarke, Edmis-
ton v. Wood, Bvckskin Hunting Club v. Bayard, and Walker Lands, su-
pra.43 Accordingly, Judge James ruled that inasmuch as the Louisiana
41 Magistrate Judge Kirk suggested that there exists a federal common law right of
navigation which includes the right to reasonably use the waters of the Mississippi River
for navigation, including transportation, commerce, boating, and fishing and hunting
from boats, laterally across the entire surface of the river to the high water mark, and that
any private ownersh ip of the banks is subject to the superior rights of the government and
the public to unhampered use of the water above them for navigation, commerce, or fish-
ing, citing, inter alia, Silver Springs Paradise Co. v. Ray, supra, State v. Barras, supra,
and D'Albora v. Gcrcia, 144 So. 2d 911 (La. App. 4 'h Cir. 1962), cert. denied, which
found that a navigable canal leading to Lake Ponchartrain which was dug by the state as a
borrow pit in the ccnstruction of a road, and used by the public to access the lake for
more than 30 years, was subject to public use for navigation and fishing even if the bed
was privately-owned. See 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 64080 (W.D. La. April 21, 2006).
42 50 F. 2d 356 (;t Cir. 1931).
43 In denying a rr otion by plaintiffs for reconsideration of his ruling, reported at 2006
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Second Circuit, C.C. art. 456, and Louisiana jurisprudence have not al-
lowed fishing or hunting on privately owned banks of navigable rivers
because these activities are not incidental to the navigable character of
the river and its enjoyment as an avenue of commerce, the sheriff had
probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs for trespassing in violati3n of R.S.
14:63 and granted the sheriff's cross motion for summary judgment seek-
ing dismissal of the case.
This decision is currently on appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Louisiana Crawfish Producers Association - West, et al v. Ame-
rada Hess Corporation, et al, 935 So. 2d 380 (La. App. 3rd Cir.
2006), writ denied 943 So. 2d 1094 (La. 2006).
A commercial crawfishermen's association and over ninety of its
members sued eighteen named defendants who were allegedly engaged
in oil and gas exploration, dredging and pipeline activities, including the
providers of surveying services for such activities. Plaintiffs alleged that
the creation of spoil banks and dams in the course of such activities in an
area comprising about 58,000 acres within the Lower Atchafalaya Basin
(referred to as the "Buffalo Cove Area") impeded the natural flow of wa-
ter in the area, destroying the aquatic ecosystem and greatly impairing
their ability to catch crawfish in the area. The Plaintiffs sought relief un-
der both state tort law and general maritime law for loss of jobs, wages,
earning capacity, and recreational enjoyment, as well as inconvenience
and mental distress. The trial court dismissed the state law claims on an
exception of no cause of action, reserving to them their right to proceed
under maritime law. The plaintiffs appealed.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal noted that the trial court ruling
was grounded primarily in the inability of plaintiffs to demonstrate a
proprietary interest in either the land of the Buffalo Cove area or the wild
crawfish which they sought to catch, citing Robins Dry Dock & Repair
Co. v. Flint," which denied a plaintiffs recovery for economic loss re-
sulting from physical damage to property in which he had no proprietary
interest. On the appeal, plaintiffs argued that they fell within exceptions
to Robins recognized in federal court decisions like Maddox v. Interna-
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77506 (W.D. La. Oct. I1, 2006), Judge James also noted that (i)
Blanchard, supra, had declined to find a federal right to fish upon the surface of flooded
swamplands lying between two navigable bodies of water, holding that the use of the bed
and banks of a waterway, particularly public fishing rights therein, remain purely matters
of state law, and (ii) the scope of the bank servitude under C.C. art. 456 does not change
depending on whether the bank is dry or covered with water (i.e., the existence of navi-
gable waters flowing over the bank does not affect the permitted uses of the bank-or the
limitations thereon-under Louisiana law and jurisprudence).
4 275 U.S. 303, 48 S. Ct. 134 (1927).
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tional Paper Co.; 45 Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V TESTBANK; 46 and
Shaughnessy v. PPG Industries, Inc.,47 among others.
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court ruling, finding that the
exceptions claimed by plaintiffs did not apply as the alleged injuries in
the cited cases had occurred in a purely maritime setting to which mari-
time law was applied or involved the plaintiffs status as a damaged ri-
parian landowner, permitting application of state law duties under C.C.
arts. 2315 (general delictual liability) or 656 (prohibiting impediment of
the natural flow of surface waters by the owner of the servient estate un-
der the natural ;ervitude of drain). The Court also noted that Dempster v.
Louis Eymard Towing Co., Inc. ,48 had dismissed the economic damage
claims of two f sherman arising from the destruction of a fishing site be-
cause they had no proprietary interest in the fish at large in state waters
and had no right to claim damages arising from the state's interfering
with the exercise of the fishing privilege it granted to them. The Court
also cited the Louisiana Supreme Court's rejection of a claim by licensed
commercial fisiermen under the "taking clause" of the United States
Constitution fo:: lost fishing profits in Louisiana Seafood Management
Council v. Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Commission,49 in which deci-
sion the Court cbserved:
The lack of any proprietary interest in the fish in the waters is well-
settled, staiutorily and judicially. See La.Civ.Code arts 450, 452; La.
Rev. Stat. 56:3. In LaBauve v. Louisiana Wild!hfe & Fisheries
Comm'n, 444 F. Supp. 1370 (E.D. La. 1978), the court explained
that 'fish which are at large in state waters are the property of the
state, as public or common things;' that 'an individual has no pro-
prietary inlerest in the fish he is prevented from catching;' and that
'an individual has no proprietary right to fish commercially in state
waters.'
Finally, thc: Third Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' contention that their
fishing licenses placed them in the category of persons holding rights
derived from the landowner like the oyster lessees in Inabnet v. Exxon
Corp.so The C >urt stated that a commercial fishing license is a state-
granted privilege subject to such limitations as the state may impose in
the exercise of ts police power and does not derive from its capacity to
lease a particular piece of land as a landowner. It also indicated that any
Article 667 duty of good neighborhood under the Civil Code affecting
4s 47 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. La. 1942).
46 752 F. 2d 1019 (5" Cir. 1985), cert. denied.
47 795 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. La. 1992).
48 503 So. 2d 99 (La. App 5 th Cir. 1987), writ denied.
49 715 So. 2d 387 (La. 1998).
so 642 So. 2d 1243 (La. 1994).
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activities on lands within the Buffalo Cove area, limiting uses of one's
property which cause damage to or deprive a neighbor of the enjoyment
his own, does not extend to everyone and does not reach members of the
public at large."
III. Related Public Access Issues
A. Bed/Bank/Overflow Determinations
The methodology for fixing the limits of ordinary high water and
ordinary low water under the bed-bank concept of the Civil Code for
navigable rivers and streams has varied over the years (e.g., lay testi-
mony, vegetation mark, averaging of annual water stage data) and is not
applied in a mechanical vacuum devoid of the realities of the land-water
features and hydrologic regime in which the determination is made. 52
Permeating the methodology chosen is a fundamental reality recognized
by Judge Leonard in Buckskin,53 by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Bar-
ras, by the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Schoeffler, 54 and
aptly applied by federal courts of appeal in determining the reach of the
COE-administered navigational servitude under the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution:
The definition of 'ordinary high water mark' advanced by appellants
would extend the regulatory jurisdiction of the United States to
farmland and hardwood forests in these bottomlands simply because
the Tombigbee River periodically floods its banks during the winter
and spring wet months. To argue that the government's jurisdiction
should extend laterally as much as three miles on either side of the
Tombigbee river is ludicrous. Appellant's definition, as the district
s' See Dumas v. Angus Chemical Co., 728 So. 2d 441 at 451 (La. App. 2nd cir. 1999),
writ denied.
52 Compare, for example, Seibert v. Conservation Commission, 181 La. 237, 159 So.
375 (La. 1935)[relying upon lay testimony in preference to 43 year averaging of the daily
low water stage under separate methods employed by the Mississippi River Commission
and the State Board of Engineers] and DeSambourg v. Board of Commissioners, 621 So.
2d 602 (La. 1993)[relying upon almost a century of Army Corps of Engineers river gauge
data]. Both cases dealt with Mississippi River batture determination. The "ordinary high
stage of water" used in defining the bank of a navigable river under the Civil Code ex-
cludes conditions of temporary overflow. See C.C. art. 456, comment (a), and C.C. art
457 (1870) ("The bank of a river is understood to be that which contains it in its ordinary
state of high water, "for the nature of the banks does not change, although for some cause
they may be overflowed for a time").
5 "This Court recognizes the difference between the banks of a navigable river and
the flood plains of a navigable river, in this case, the Atchafalaya River."
5 "Our jurisprudence is filled with the problems inherent in surveying a single
boundary line that involves a body of water, because water is fluid. Rivers change course,
overflow, move their beds, deposit silt, form deltas. Lakes swell for miles, and their beds
dry up completely; some are ephemeral, not real lakes, and exist only when another body
of water overflows." See, e.g., McDade, supra, and also Ellerbe v. Grace, 162 La. 846,
Ill So. 185 (1927).
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court noted, "would recognize no horizontal limits to the 'bed' of a
navigable r ver in those areas where the banks are relatively low and
flat ... ' As one federal court of appeals recently noted,
There must ... be horizontal limits to the 'bed' of a river; oth-
erwise the navigational servitude would extend indefinitely in
all directions and swallow up any claim for just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment for damages occurring anywhere
below the elevation of the high-water mark. ss
B. Navigability
The navigability of a body of water is never presumed, and the bur-
den of proof in matters of navigability lies with the party seeking to es-
tablish navigability.56 Whether a water body is navigable in law (and, for
example, State-owned by right of inherent sovereignty or under long-
established public policy against alienation of navigable waterbottoms)
depends on whether the water body is navigable in fact (e.g., in 1812 s or
at the time of segregation58 ). Generally, a water body is deemed naviga-
ble in fact if the water body in its ordinary state is used or susceptible to
being used as a highway of commerce over which trade and travel are or
may be conducted by the customary modes of trade and travel on water.
The mere fact that small craft could navigate a body of water does not
prove navigabiliy, nor is use exclusively by pleasure craft sufficient.
As observed at 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters §3, the legal concept of navi-
gability cannot 'e determined by a formula which fits every type of
stream or water body under all circumstances and at all times. Each de-
termination must rest on the facts and circumstances of the particular
case.60
ss See US. v Harrell, 926 F. 2d 1036 at 1043 (1Ith Cir. 1991). Note, for example, 33
CFR §329.11 (a)(1), ostablishing the "ordinary high water mark" on the shore of non-tidal
rivers subject to COE jurisdiction as the line indicated by physical characteristics or
"other appropriate means that consider the characteristics of the surrounding areas." Such
considerations may include the natural line impressed on the bank, shelving, soil charac-
teristics, vegetation, scour, deposition, gage data, elevation data, historic water flow, and
the manipulation ofvater levels and flows by human intervention.
56 Burns v. Crescent Gun & Rod Club, 41 So. 249 (La. 1906); McCluskey v. Meraux
and Nunez, Inc., 186 So. 117 (La. 1939); State ex rel. Guste v. Two O'Clock Bayou Land
Company, 365 So. 2d 1174 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1978), writ refused.
" The admission of Louisiana to the Union in 1812 vested ownership in the state of
the beds of all navigable waters by virtue of its inherent sovereignty.
5 See Vermilion Bay Land Company v. Philips Petroleum Co., et al, 646 So. 2d 408
at 410-412 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1994), writ denied.
s9 See McCearley v. Lemennier, 2 So. 649 (La. 1888); Burns v. Crescent Gun & Rod
Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249 (1906)'9; St. Mary Parish Land Co. v. State Mineral
Board, 167 So. 2d 5C9 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), writ refused; Sinclair Oil & Gas v. Dela-
croix Corp., 285 So. :d 845 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1973); Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., Inc.,
supra.
60 Artificial impacts on navigability should also be considered. See, e.g., Slattery v.
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C. Obstruction6 1
The Attorney General of the State of Louisiana has on several occa-
sions affirmed that a landowner may prohibit others from entering his
property to crawfish on overflowed natural bank areas, effected through
the various posting laws of the state.62 So long as it does not embarrass
the lawful public uses incident to navigation, posting a private river bank
is often legally essential in order to give notice to the passing traveler or
public user that prohibited bank and inland activities like hunting and
crawfishing are not allowed. Note also in this regard decisions of the
Louisiana Supreme Court which have likewise recognized that (i) post-
ing a riverbank may indicate to the passing user that the bank is not
available for picnics and campfires and (ii) many lands are burdened
with servitudes like the riparian servitude affecting the privately-owned
bank of a state-owned navigable stream, but the owner thereof is no less
in possession of the affected land, nor does the servitude serve to divest
the owner of his title.6
D. Private canals, sloughs and drainage channels within pri-
vate lands
Under Louisiana law, waterways created by acts of man on private
property for private purposes, such as canals, whether navigable or not,
and natural non-navigable water bodies made navigable through acts of
man are private things which are not subject to public use. Moreover,
the mere use of public funds in the construction of navigable canals on
private property does not create a public right of use of the canal, unless
the construction of the canal substantially impairs or destroys the naviga-
Arkansas Natural Gas Company, et al, 138 La. 793, 70 So. 806 (1916), involving the
recession of waters from a body of water resulting from artificial obstruction of the inlets
by the state and federal governments; compare Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. State Min-
eral Board, 14 So. 2d 61 (La. 1943) and Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 98 So. 2d 326
(La. 1957), distinguishing successive and imperceptible changes which have been con-
tributed to by the acts of man; note Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co., Inc., supra, regard-
ing navigational servitudes. Note also Kaiser Aetna, supra, 100 S. Ct. 383 at 388-389.
61 C.C. art. 458 (works obstructing the public use); R.S. 14:97 (simple obstruction of
a highway of commerce).
62 See, e.g., Op. Atty. Gen. 85-333, 88-649, and 01-362; note also 83-680.
63 See, e.g., R.S. 14:63 (criminal trespass).
64 See, e.g., Chaney v. State Mineral Board, 444 So. 2d 105 at 122 (La. 1983); St.
Mary Parish Land Company v. State Mineral Board, 167 So. 2d 509 at 516 (La. 1964);
note also Op. Atty Gen. June 11. 1938, and Op. 85-333, 89-475, 90-512, and 91-195; but
note 90-557 .
65 See La. C.C. Art. 506 and the official comments thereunder, Art. 450 and Art. 456,
comment (f); Olin Gas Transmission Corp. v. Harrison, 132 So. 2d 721 (La. App. 1961),
cert. denied; National Audubon Society v. White, 302 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 3 d Cir. 1974),
writ denied; Amigo Enterprises v. Gonzales, 581 So. 2d 1082 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991),
and Cenac v. Public Access Water Rights Association, supra, noting the requirements for
an implied dedication to public use.
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bility of surrounding natural waterways to such an extent that the new
waterway systerr serves as a substitute for the pre-existing natural sys-
tem."
. Louisiana courts have rejected the suggestion that the public owner-
ship and use of running water includes the right of access for fishing or
hunting on running waters which traverse privately owned lands, includ-.
ing canals."
Thus, ordin rily, the mere fact that canals are dug by mineral explo-
ration or pipeline companies under private lease or servitude agreements
on privately owied land between existing navigable waterways does
nothing to vest a public right of access to or use of the canal absent ex-
ceptional circumstances involving public expenditures to construct or
maintain the canal and/or its impact on adjacent, public navigable wa-
terways.
For example, in Buckskin the defendants attempted to no avail to
suggest a use of government funds to maintain a canal by removing
fallen trees from the canal after Hurricane Andrew, but made no showing
of consent to the arrangement by the affected private landowners. Note
also National Audubon Society v. White, supra ("We do not feel that the
removal of debris from the [McIlhenny] canal by the Army Corps of En-
gineers following a disaster such as Hurricane Audrey constituted the use
of public funds for the maintenance of the canal.") and Cenac, discussed
within.
In Vermilion Corp. v. Vaughn, supra, the Louisiana Supreme Court
interpreted the United States Supreme Court decision in Vaughn v. Ver-
milion Corp.," to indicate that a federal law navigation servitude may
exist in a private canal if it can be proven that the construction of the arti-
ficial waterway substantially impaired or destroyed a preexisting natural,
navigable waterway, allowing the public to use the artificial waterway as
a substitute for the natural one. In Buckskin, witnesses affected by the
outcome of the action gave opinions as to whether private canals cap-
tured the flow of connecting public streams during the period of use by,
66 See State Dept of Highways v. Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle Co., Ltd., 350 So. 2d
847 (La. 1977); Vermilion Corporation v. Vaughn, 397 So.2d 490 (La. 1981); Brown v.
Rougon, 552 So.2d 1052 (La. App. I Cir. 1989), writ denied; Dardar v. Lafourche Re-
alty Co., Inc., No. 15-1015 (E.D. La. 1991), affirmed in part, vacated in part and re-
manded, 985 F. 2d 8:4 (USCA, 5 'h Cir. 1993); Op. Atty Gen. No. 93-238.
67 See Brown v. Pougon, supra, (recognizing that although subject to public use, the
water running naturally in a private canal does not give the public the right to navigate
and fish in the canal); Amigo Enterprises, Inc. v. Gonzales, supra; Dardar v. Lafourche
Realty Co., Inc., sup a; People for Open Waters, Inc. v. Estate of Gray, 643 So.2d 415
(La. App. 3rd Cir. IS 94); Cenac v. Public Access Water Rights Association, supra; and
Buckskin Hunting Club v. Bayard, supra; but note Chaney, supra.
68 444 U.S. 206, 100 S. Ct. 399,,62 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1979).
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and within the knowledge of, such witness, but there was no testimony
from a witness possessing scientific competence or special study tied to
such matters as the actual origins of the canals, the condition or nature of
the affected natural waterways at such time, the effects of artificial con-
ditions in the Basin since that time, including the raising and lowering of
water levels in the Basin by the Army Corps of Engineers, on the navi-
gability of specific natural streams claimed to be either destroyed or sub-
stantially impaired because of the construction of the canal, among other
considerations, which would meet the burden of proof to support a find-
ing that federal law navigation rights burden private ownership interests.
Such inquiries are fact specific to each location which must be consid-
ered and researched individually to be proven legally whether or not a
canal did actually in fact take the course of a bayou. Buckskin suggests
the need for sufficient proof of such facts, as by Corps of Engineers or
competent expert testimony.
Consider also La. R. S. 9:1251, which expressly provides that
whenever any landowner voluntarily, whether expressly or tacitly, per-
mits passage through or across his land by the public solely for the pur-
pose of providing a convenience to such persons in the ingress and egress
to and from waters for boating, or for the purpose of ingress and egress
to and from any recreational site, neither the public nor any person shall
thereby acquire a servitude or right of passage, nor shall such passage
become a public road by reason of upkeep, maintenance or work per-
formed thereon by any governing authority.
D. The federal navigational servitude under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution
The Court in Buckskin indicated that even recognition of a federal
navigational servitude on navigable waters of the United States regulated
by the Army Corps of Engineers under the authority of the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution would provide no basis for recognizing a
public right to use private waterways like canals for hunting therefrom or
for accessing adjacent private lands for purposes incident to such activ-
ity." Consideration should also be given in this regard to jurisprudence
indicating that the federal servitude - which gives rise to a right of public
use of waterways as continuous highways for the purpose of navigation
in interstate commerce - does not extend to the extraction of goods there-
after transported in commerce.70
69 See also Blanchard (crawfishing) and PARM discussed within.
70 See Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. 71, 15 L. Ed. 269 (1855); McCready v. Virginia, 94
U.S. 391, 24 L.Ed. 248 (1877) (regarding the authority of Virginia to regulate oyster cultiva-
tion in its tidal rivers: "[T]here is here no question of transportation or exchange of commodi-
ties, but only of cultivation and production. Commerce has nothing to do with land while
producing, but only with the product after it has become the subject of trade."); Manchester
v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 11 S. Ct. 559, 35 L. Ed. 159 (1891); Douglas v. Seacoast Prod-
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IV. Conclusion
As revealed by the foregoing and as recognized by the Rights to
Public Access Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute, the issues
affecting claims of public access to water bodies in Louisiana are often
numerous and complex, requiring technical scientific analysis, historical
cartographic and hydrologic research, and careful legal exegesis of legis-
lation and case precedents to properly identify and apply the law to the
issues presented in what is frequently an emotion-charged dispute with
cultural and political overtones. Hopefully, recent developments in this
area of the law will clarify the some of the confusion and misunderstand-
ing which has characterized so much of the controversy.
acts, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 97 S. Ct. 1740, 52 L.Ed.2d 304 (1977); note also Moore v. Hampton
Roads Sanitation, 557 F.2d 1030 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied [harvesting of oysters from
leases issued by Virginia is a purely local activity subject to Virginia state law, as recognized
by Congress in the Submerged Lands Act] and Loving v. Alexander, 745 F.2d 861 (4th Cir.
1984) (the federal navigational servitude under the Commerce Clause does not include public
ishing rights, a matter govemed by state law); see also Kaiser Aetna and Blanchard, supra..
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